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Fundamental Issues
The Brexit referendum and the decision of British voters to leave the EU have sparked a compre-
hensive debate on the future of European integration. A key issue in this debate is the appropria-
te division of responsibilities between the EU and its Member States. The EU might still lack certain 
competencies which are crucial for a functioning Union or resilient euro area. At the same time, 
however, some of the EU’s existing competencies might be better allocated to Member States.
This policy brief documents results from a survey on the future of European integration conduc-
ted in the national parliaments of both France and Germany, including the French Sénat, the As-
semblée Nationale and the German Bundestag, between April and July 2016. 
Research Question  
and Relevance
The survey identifies areas in which French and German politicians have convergent and diver-
gent views on possible integration options:  
 ͮ  French members of parliament (MPs) support granting more competencies to the EU in the 
fields of immigration, taxation, wages, labour market regulation and defence. 
 ͮ  German MPs support greater integration in the EU in terms of immigration and defence policy. 
 ͮ  MPs of both countries are undecided as to whether they support the integration of energy po-
licy and whether more flexibility is needed in national labour markets.
 ͮ  Social democratic and Socialist MPs are more inclined than their conservative colleagues to 
accept further competencies to the EU in the selected fields of policy.
 ͮ  With respect to the future of the euro area, both French and German MPs tend to agree that hig-
her national investments are required to stimulate growth. There is, however, considerable dis-
agreement on the possible introduction of Eurobonds with French MPs advocating such a policy 
and German MPs opposing it. Moreover, German MPs do not support the introduction of a Euro-
pean unemployment insurance scheme in the euro area whilst French MPs are undecided on this.
 ͮ  Views on the current role of monetary policy are polarised between Berlin and Paris. The ECB’s 
asset purchase programmes enjoy strong backing from French MPs, but are generally viewed 
more critically by members of the Bundestag.
 ͮ  The Franco-German divide is also visible within party families. German conservatives, for in-
stance, are much more negative about both Eurobonds as well as the ECB’s asset purchase 
programs than French conservatives. 
 ͮ  There is a Franco-German consensus in support of steps towards greater integration in Euro-
pe in the fields of defence and immigration policies.
Key Findings
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1. Introduction
The United Kingdom’s vote to leave the EU has not only sparked a debate on the possible conse-
quences of Brexit itself (ZEW 2016), but has also raised the question as to what the most desira-
ble course for future European integration is.  Suggestions for reform are highly diverse and ran-
ge from strategies aiming at a federalist union with much more policy competencies at the EU 
level to disintegration, with more autonomy at the national level. 
A prerequisite of a promising new integration strategy is the broad support of EU Member States 
and their policy makers. We here present survey evidence on the support for several related EU 
reform options and policy strategies for national MPs from both France and Germany. Over the his-
tory of European integration, France and Germany have played an important role in proposing new 
integration initiatives. A political consensus between Germany and France does not, of course, 
guarantee that integration proposals will be accepted by the EU-27 as a whole. However, it is hard-
ly realistic to expect ideas for reform which are not supported by the national parliaments in Berlin 
and Paris to be adopted by the post-Brexit EU. A Franco-German consensus is therefore a neces-
sary (but obviously not sufficient) condition for the viability of a new approach to integration.
In view of the above considerations, we have conducted a survey  amongst the members of the na-
tional parliaments of both France (Assemblée Nationale as well as Sénat) and Germany (German 
Bundestag) on the future of European integration.1 While established surveys such as Eurobarome-
ter regularly analyse the integration preferences of EU residents, there is a lack of evidence showing 
what national policy-makers think of the different alternative options for European integration.
In fact, our survey has asked members of the two national parliaments about their views not only on 
European integration in general,2 but also on specific instruments and options for integration, i.e. 
different policy areas in which integration might take place.3 This corresponds to the view of the aca-
demic literature that the division of competencies between the EU and its Member States is subop-
timal from a fiscal federalism perspective, with the recommendations to move competencies both 
upwards and downwards (Berger and Heinemann, 2016; Bassford et al., 2013; Alesina et al., 2005).
The present survey covers three areas. Firstly, members of parliament indicate whether they sup-
port or oppose more European integration in six specific fields of policy: energy, immigration, 
taxation, wages, labour market regulation and defence. Secondly, the survey covers the accep-
tance of different actual policy proposals and current policies related to European Monetary Uni-
on (EMU): common unemployment insurance, Eurobonds and quantitative easing of the ECB. 
Thirdly, it indicates MPs support for economic policies to be implemented on the national level 
of the individual European Member States with the objective to increase growth in the euro area 
(higher national investment and increased flexibility in Member States’ national labour markets).
2. Survey Details
The bilingual survey was conducted jointly by ZEW, the University of Mannheim and the École Poly-
technique. It is supported by the German Research Foundation’s Collaborative Research Centre “Po-
1  Inclusion of Germany’s first chamber, the Bundesrat, is not possible given that it includes only of a few representatives of the German 
states’ governments. 
2  In their comparative analysis, Deschouwer et al. (2014) survey MPs in 15 countries about their support for more European integration. 
However, the authors did not ask about specific policies for future integration.
3  Similar surveys addressed the introduction of a minimum tax rate in the EU with members of the European Parliament (Heinemann and 
Osterloh, 2013) and the German Bundestag (Heinemann and Janeba, 2011). 
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litical Economy of Reforms”. The questionnaires for the French and German MPs were formulated 
in French and German, respectively, but contained the same content and similar wording.
The survey was sent out in both France and Germany in late April 2016. Cover letters along with 
the three-page survey were sent out at the same time, from Palaiseau in French for the French 
parliaments, and from Mannheim in German for the Bundestag. The questionnaire was first sent 
to the main office of the respective MPs at either parliament by post. The MPs were then able to 
respond either by post, email, fax, or via a separate online-survey tool. Reminder emails were 
then sent to those who had not yet participated in the survey and who had not explicitly declined 
to participate. Finally, MPs who had still not answered to the survey were contacted by phone. 
Completed surveys were received between late April and the middle of July 2016. In order to use 
the characteristics of individual MPs (party membership, age, gender, etc.) for research purpo-
ses, the survey was not anonymized. The confidentiality of the individual answers was, however, 
guaranteed in order to encourage unbiased reporting of preferences.
In total, 232 completed questionnaires from the 1,552 questionnaires sent were returned. This 
amounts to a response rate of 14.95%. German MPs were slightly more responsive than their 
French counterparts, with response rates of 16.03% and 14.21%, respectively.4 
3. Preferences for EU Competencies
Figure 1 provides an overview of the integration preferences across the six fields of policy covered 
based on the country-specific means. For each of these six fields of policy, survey participants 
were asked whether the EU should be granted more competencies in the respective field. The 
content of the hypothetical European competency was indicated as follows.5 
 ͮ  Energy policy: EU should be able to enforce binding guidelines on the Member States in re-
gard to the energy mix.
 ͮ  Immigration policy: Greater role for the EU in immigration policy e.g. on admission standards 
or distribution of refugees.
 ͮ Tax policy: Qualified majority voting in Council on tax issues. 
 ͮ Wage policy: EU to have greater rights to intervene in wage policies (e.g. minimum wages).
 ͮ  Labour market regulation: EU to have the ability to enforce binding guidelines on Member 
States regarding, for example, employment protection.
 ͮ  Defence policy: Establishment of a European army financed from EU budget.
MPs were able to answer each of these questions on a scale between -4 (“Disagree) via 0 (“Un-
decided”) to +4 (“Agree”). Hence, a higher mean value signals stronger support for the accordance 
of more competencies to the EU in the specific field.
A first overall result is that German members of parliament are in general more reluctant than their 
French colleagues to shift more competencies to the EU. For the two French chambers there are 
positive means for all six fields of policy. There are positive means for only two fields of policy for 
the Bundestag. 67.1% of all answers in France are in the positive range of responses (from +1 to 
+4), whereas the same applies for only 53.9% of all responses in Germany. In particular, French 
MPs agree on average to granting more competencies to the EU in the fields of immigration, taxa-
tion, wage policy, labour market regulation and defence policy. German politicians strongly agree 
with integration of immigration policies in the EU and also support common defence policies. Ger-
man MPs do not, however, agree to granting the EU increased competencies for wage and labour 
4  The French Sénat (15.27%) was slightly more responsive than the Assemblée Nationale (13.57%).
5  Note that a full text version of all survey questions is given in the Appendix.
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regulation policy. Moreover, German MPs are on average undecided as to whether they support 
further integration of energy and tax policy, with mean values of -0.29 and -0.02, respectively. 
Figure 2 illustrates responses for the six fields of policy in more detail, i.e. the relative frequencies 
of answers by category in per cent. The distribution of individual answers for a given question 
might indicate a polarisation of opinion which cannot be seen by simple averages. In regard to 
energy policy, French politicians for instance are generally undecided as to whether they support 
further integration. A substantial proportion of answers (24.4%), however, indicate strong disag-
reement. In contrast, French MPs show particular support for increased competencies on the Eu-
ropean level in the field of defence policy, with an average response of 1.8 and 33.4% of all res-
pective answers strongly supporting more integration (+4). 
Note that despite the fact that German MPs are on average undecided as to whether they support 
further integration in the field of energy policy, 47.0% and 47.5% of German politicians either 
disagree or agree with this option, i.e. give answers in the range of either -4 to -1, or +1 to +4, in 
regard to this question. German MPs are also undecided on their view of the integration of tax 
policies even though 22.0% of German MPs do, however, strongly disagree strongly with integ-
ration in this field (-4). Moreover, there is a clear support for more integration on immigration po-
licies with 88.6% of answers ranging from values from +1 to +4. Only 5.4% of German MPs do not 
support granting the EU further competencies in this area. By contrast, 60.6% and 56.7% of Ger-
man MPs disagree with giving the EU further competencies in the fields of wage policy and labour 
market regulations, respectively.
Despite some disagreement between French and German MPs on the allocation of more compe-
tencies to the EU for tax policy, wage setting and labour market regulation, there is thus a remar-
kable degree of consensus in regard to fields of policy with integration potential. National parli-
aments in both countries strongly support the attribution of more competencies to the EU for both 
immigration and defence policies.
Joint Support for 
European Immigration 
and Defence
Figure 1: Average Support for More Competencies of the EU 
Source: Own calculations. The graph displays the country-specific averages of individual responses of German and French MPs, which are 
weighted by the inverse probability of age, gender, fraction in parliament, parliament and membership to ruling party in the respective country 
to gain representativeness of answers to overall population of MPs. The answers to the related questions are based on a scale ranging from -4 
(“Disagree”) via 0 (“Undecided”) to +4 (“Agree”), respectively (see Appendix A1).
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4. Euro Area Issues
The great recession in the years following 2008 and the resulting debt crisis have resulted in a 
debate on deeper fiscal integration of the EMU. One of the key questions in this debate is whe-
ther a system with centralised monetary policy and independent fiscal policies in each Member 
States can function. Severe fiscal and economic imbalances and the debt crisis have led to calls 
for new risk-sharing mechanisms for the euro area. The idea is that new fiscal stabilisation me-
chanisms could serve as an insurance mechanism in case of asymmetric macroeconomic shocks 
in the EMU. Opponents, however, point to moral hazard problems as well as to the economic and 
political risks of transfer dependency by increasing fiscal integration. 
In view of this, the survey also asked MPs about their preferences in regard to policy proposals, 
which are intended to increase fiscal integration in the EMU, i.e. the introduction of Eurobonds 
as well as a common European unemployment insurance (EMU-UI). Eurobonds represent joint 
sovereign bond emissions of all EMU countries with collective guarantees which would ultimate-
ly result in one uniform interest yield for all members of the euro area independent of their vary-
ing individual default risk or the respective soundness of public finances. EMU-UI, however, would 
provide unemployment benefit transfers to individual Member States in times of economic crisis 
and might accordingly stabilise available incomes across Member States (Dolls et al., 2014).
French and German MPs were also asked to evaluate the current role of the ECB through its asset 
purchasing programmes (quantitative easing, ECB QE). Following the example of the US Fed and 
the Bank of England, the ECB has started QE programmes confronted with a situation of both cen-
tral bank rates at the zero lower bound and low or even negative inflation. Since March 2015, the 
Selected Fiscal and 
Monetary Policies  
in the EMU
Figure 2: Distribution of Preferences Regarding Integration Policies (in per cent)
Source: Own calculations. The graph displays the country-specific proportions of individual responses of German and French MPs to the ques-
tion under consideration, which are weighted by the inverse probability of age, gender, fraction in parliament, parliament and membership to 
ruling party in the respective country to gain representativeness of answers to overall population of MPs. The answers to the related questions 
are based on a scale ranging from -4 (“Disagree”) via 0 (“Undecided”) to +4 (“Agree”), respectively (see Appendix A1).
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ECB has been buying substantial amounts of assets (initially 60 billion euro per month) from EU 
sovereigns and banks to combat threats of deflation and thereby achieve its mandate of price-
stability with a target inflation rate of 2% per annum. After initially limiting the programme to 
September 2016, the programme’s duration has in the meantime been extended to the point at 
which sufficiently high (long-run) inflation rates are achieved. QE was even increased in March 
2016, with the monthly asset purchases being raised to 80 billion euros, now also including cor-
porate bonds. European QE is highly controversial with supporters pointing to a lack of alterna-
tives given zero interest rates and critics raising concerns regarding asset price inflation, indirect 
government financing and long-run risks for financial stability. 
In regard to economic policy strategies for higher growth at the national level in the EMU, our sur-
vey covers two distinct approaches: higher investment spending and structural reforms aiming 
at greater flexibility in labour markets. Both dimensions form part of the political agenda of the 
European Commission as part of the so-called “Juncker plan” (Juncker, 2014). Moreover, these 
strategies represent a typical “demand-side” (higher investment spending) and “supply-side” 
(labour market flexibility) approach.
Figure 3 shows the country-specific means for the responses of MPs with respect to ECB asset 
purchases, the proposals for the institutions of the euro area and desirable national policies. 
French MPs strongly back what the ECB is doing and are firmly in favour of Eurobonds and higher 
national investments as a remedy for low growth. German MPs on average support only higher 
investments at the national level and are particularly sceptical of European unemployment insu-
rance and the introduction of Eurobonds. 
Figure 4 focuses in more detail on the two policies for the euro area, which must be jointly imple-
mented by all EMU members, i.e. EMU-UI as well as Eurobonds. The results indicate a divide between 
French and German MPs in regard to a common EMU-UI as well as the implementation of Euro-
bonds in the EMU. The majority of German MPs are opposed to an EMU-UI as a risk-sharing me-
chanism in times of economic crisis (52.5%), and 29.5% strongly reject this policy (-4). However, 
opinions on this issue are more heterogeneous among French MPs with an average response of 
0.1 (“undecided” category). Moreover, German MPs on average disagree with the introduction of 
Eurobonds in the EMU with a substantial proportion of MPs, 35.4%, strongly disagreeing (-4). In 
National Policy 
Initiatives in the EMU
No Consensus on QE, 
Eurobonds and EMU-UI
Figure 3: Average Preferences in Regard to Selected EMU Reform Proposals 
Source: Own calculations. The graph displays the country-specific averages of individual responses of German and French MPs, which are 
weighted by the inverse probability of age, gender, fraction in parliament, parliament and membership to ruling party in the respective country 
to gain representativeness of answers to overall population of MPs. The answers to the related questions are based on a scale ranging from -4 
(“Disagree”) via 0 (“Undecided”) to +4 (“Agree”), respectively (see Appendix A2).
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contrast, a substantial majority of French MPs, 71.3%, see a need for Eurobond emissions. More- 
over, the lower panel of Figure 4 shows the distribution of answers for the ECB asset purchase 
programmes by country. A substantial majority of French MPs agree with the active role of the ECB 
(76.8%), and only a minor fraction of 5.2% of national politicians in France strongly oppose the 
QE programme of the ECB (-4). Although German MPs are on average slightly opposed to the QE 
programme, 44.3% of German MPs do agree with QE.
Figure 4: Preferences in Regard to Potential New Euro Area Institutions
Source: Own calculations. The graph displays the country-specific proportions of individual responses of German and French MPs to the ques-
tion under consideration, which are weighted by the inverse probability of age, gender, fraction in parliament, parliament and membership to 
ruling party in the respective country to gain representativeness of answers to overall population of MPs. The answers to the related questions 
are based on a scale ranging from -4 (“Disagree”) via 0 (“Undecided”) to +4 (“Agree”), respectively (see Appendix A2.1).
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It is striking that a majority of MPs in both countries are in favour of higher investment at the na-
tional level in order to stimulate growth in the EMU, 92.5% and 85.1% of French and German MPs, 
respectively (Figure 5). Responses are more heterogeneous, however, with respect to an increase 
in the flexibility of labour markets. Both French and German MPs are on average undecided on 
this question, with average responses of approximately 0.2 and -0.1, respectively. The variance 
within parliaments is, however, large when it comes to the issue of flexibility. 
5. Impact of Party Ideology
Ideological factors can play a substantial role in the formation of opinion on foreign politics and 
European integration in particular. In order to account for this issue, we analyse the role of party 
influence on integration preferences of MPs in the selected fields of policy in the present survey. 
For the sake of comparability, we match each parliamentary group of the French Sénat, Assemb-
lée Nationale and the German Bundestag to the respective political group in the European Parli-
ament. Out of 1,552 French and German MPs, only 29 French politicians do not belong to a nati-
onal party affiliated with one of the political groups in the European Parliament. Party-independent 
members in both the Sénat and the Assemblée Nationale, members of the Communist party in 
Franco-German 
 Consensus on 
Higher Investments
Figure 5: Preferences on National Growth Policies
Source: Own calculations. The graph displays the country-specific proportions of individual responses of German and French MPs to the ques-
tion under consideration, which are weighted by the inverse probability of age, gender, fraction in parliament, parliament and membership to 
ruling party in the respective country to gain representativeness of answers to overall population of MPs. The answers to the related questions 
are based on a scale ranging from -4 (“Disagree”) via 0 (“Undecided”) to +4 (“Agree”), respectively (see Appendix A2.2).
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France (PCF) and some members of the RDSE (Rassemblement Démocratique et Social Européen) 
could not be matched to either group. In the following, we compare integration preferences across 
the two largest political groups in the European Parliament, which represent approximately 54% 
of the total seats, namely the European People‘s Party group (EPP) and the Progressive Alliance 
of Socialists and Democrats (S&D).6 The EPP comprises MPs from the CDU/CSU and Les Républi-
cains from France and Germany, respectively. Members of the German SPD, as well as members 
of the French PS and PRG parties, participate in the European Parliament’s S&D. 
Figure 6 shows the average preferences of both French and German MPs on integration of com-
petencies in the aforementioned six policy fields. It becomes apparent that the MPs from EPP 
parties are always more sceptical than members of S&D parties about an increased allocation of 
competencies to the EU. Whilst conservative MPs tend to agree with the accordance of more com-
petencies to the EU in the fields of immigration and defence only, social democrats and socialists 
on average accept integration in all of the six selected fields of policy. Furthermore, MPs from EPP 
parties disagree with the bestowal of further competencies to the EU in the fields of energy and 
wage policy as well as in labour regulation. Both groups, however, on average support giving 
further competencies to the EU with respect to defence and immigration policy.
Left-wing and conservative parties differ markedly in regard to their support of economic policy 
strategies for the euro area (Figure 7). Left-wing MPs tend to favour Eurobonds, heavy ECB involve-
ment and EMU-UI. They oppose more flexibility in labour markets. Conservative MPs tend to adopt 
the opposite positions. However, national politicians in both political groups agree there is a 
need for higher national investments to stimulate economic growth in the euro area.
This result is consistent with the assumption of greater support amongst conservative parties for 
supply-side positions and a stronger belief of the political left in stabilisation tools and solidarity. 
6 Other important political groups in the European Parliament like ALDE, GUE-NGL, the Greens/EFA and the ENF are not represented by 
sufficient number of observations to allow for the construction of meaningful statistical averages. By the same token, we do not consider the 
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) or independent members of the parliament 
as they are not related MPs in neither the German nor the French assemblies and are therefore not relevant for the current analysis. 
National Conservatives 
More Sceptical about 
Further Integration
Left-Wing MPs Support 
Redistributive Policies  
in EMU
Figure 6: Average Integration Preferences by Political Group
Source: Own calculations. The graph displays the respective averages of individual responses of German and French national MPs with respect 
to (hypothetical) membership to political groups of the European Parliament. The averages are weighted by the inverse probability of age, gen-
der, parliament and membership to ruling party in the respective country to gain representativeness of answers to overall population of MPs. 
The answers to the related questions are based on a scale ranging from -4 (“Disagree”) via 0 (“Undecided”) to +4 (“Agree”), respectively (see 
Appendix A1).
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While this left-right divide of positions is hardly surprising, it is informative to compare French and 
German positions within one identical party family, i.e. one political group in the European Parlia-
ment. For that purpose, we show the average preferences for EMU-related reform proposals and 
policy strategies for S&D MPs (Figure 8) and EPP MPs (Figure 9) by country. These figures show that 
the differences between French and German views on economic policy might be also present within 
a single party family. Whilst members of parties affiliated to the social democratic and socialist 
group S&D agree across all selected reform initiatives and current policies, German social demo-
crats are generally less supportive than their French counterparts. Figure 9 indicates disagreement 
between French and German conservatives in two important fields of policy. Whilst French MPs from 
the conservative Les Républicains are on average not against both Eurobonds and the asset 
Figure 8: Average Preferences in Regard to Selected EMU Reform Proposals for S&D Group
Source: Own calculations. The graph displays the respective averages of individual responses of German and French national MPs with respect 
to (hypothetical) membership to the S&D group of the European Parliament. The averages are weighted by the inverse probability of age, gen-
der, parliament and membership to ruling party in the respective country to gain representativeness of answers to overall population of MPs. 
The answers to the related questions are based on a scale ranging from -4 (“Disagree”) via 0 (“Undecided”) to +4 (“Agree”), respectively (see 
Appendix A2).
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Figure 7: Average Preferences Regarding Selected EMU Reform Proposals by Political Group
Source: Own calculations. The graph displays the respective averages of individual responses of German and French national MPs with respect 
to (hypothetical) membership to political groups of the European Parliament. The averages are weighted by the inverse probability of age, gen-
der, parliament and membership to ruling party in the respective country to gain representativeness of answers to overall population of MPs. 
The answers to the related questions are based on a scale ranging from -4 (“Disagree”) via 0 (“Undecided”) to +4 (“Agree”), respectively (see 
Appendix A2).
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purchase programmes of the ECB, German MPs of CDU/CSU strongly oppose these policies. MPs 
from both countries of the conservative EPP group, however, agree to higher investments, more 
flexible labour markets and disagree with the installment of European unemployment insurance.
The prevalent differences of opinion within party families between France and Germany are an 
important finding. This clarifies that the Franco-German heterogeneity is not simply the outcome 
of the current differences in the weights of parties within the parliaments.
6. Implications for Potential Integration Options
The insights provided by this survey must be interpreted with caution. Different views of French and 
German members of parliament may not necessarily reflect a fundamental and deeply-rooted long-
run dissent in integration preferences. The different fiscal and economic performance of both coun-
tries can be expected to influence responses – Germany is currently in a situation of budgetary sur-
plus whilst France continues to see growing debt levels. This asymmetric fiscal situation might 
explain the different views on fiscal insurance or mutual guarantees of representatives from both 
countries. The country in a more favourable situation, Germany, may not perceive the possible be-
nefits identified by a country such as France, which finds itself in a more difficult fiscal environment. 
Conversely, the particular burden on Germany in the refugee crisis helps to explain why German 
MPs are particularly keen to concede more power to Brussels in the relevant field of policy.
With these caveats in mind, and given the pivotal role of both countries in the creation of possi-
ble new integration initiatives, the present survey may give some guidance as to where it is more 
realistic to expect a consensus. Overall, French MPs are more in favour of giving greater compe-
tencies to the EU in several fields of policy covered in the survey, than their German counterparts 
are. On average, they agree with further integration in the fields of immigration, taxation, wages, 
labour market regulation and defence. German MPs agree with their French colleagues in sup-
porting the accordance of more competencies to the EU in the fields of immigration and defence 
policy only. MPs from both countries are, however, undecided as to whether they support further 
integration of energy policies in the EU.
Figure 9: Average Preferences in Regard to Selected EMU Reform Proposals for EPP Group
Source: Own calculations. The graph displays the respective averages of individual responses of German and French national MPs with respect 
to (hypothetical) membership to the EPP group of the European Parliament. The averages are weighted by the inverse probability of age, gen-
der, parliament and membership to ruling party in the respective country to gain representativeness of answers to overall population of MPs. 
The answers to the related questions are based on a scale ranging from -4 (“Disagree”) via 0 (“Undecided”) to +4 (“Agree”), respectively (see 
Appendix A2).
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The point of consensus in regard to integration preferences for defence and immigration is remark-
able and could point to a window of opportunity for further political integration in the post-Brexit 
EU. The United Kingdom, with its substantial defence capacities and individual strategic objecti-
ves, has always been highly critical with respect to any Europeanisation of defence policy. When 
this critical voice leaves the EU, debates concerning greater collaboration across the EU in the 
field of defence, or even the creation of a European army could therefore gain momentum. This 
is even more likely given that two large Member States with significant defence capacities are in 
support of this notion. By the same token, the French and German consensus on granting the EU 
more power in immigration and refugee policy is remarkable given that both countries are affec-
ted differently by recent refugee immigration into Europe. 
The consensus on euro area policies is much more limited. There is disagreement between MPs 
from both countries regarding the introduction of Eurobonds. French politicians tend to support 
introduction whilst German MPs are more critical. A EMU-UI is not backed by national politicians 
in Germany either. Interestingly, there is also a clear difference in the support for these euro re-
form options within party families. German MPs in both the conservative and the social demo-
cratic/socialist party groups are more negative than the respective French MPs.  MPs from both 
countries are undecided as to whether more flexibility should be given to national labour mar-
kets, which, however, reflects strong support (opposition) from conservative (social democratic/
socialist) MPs but no cross-border dissent within party groups. 
A greater degree of consensus between French and German MPs views on euro area economic po-
licy only exists for a priority of higher national investments. Politicians from both countries (and 
different parties) agree that greater investments made by national governments constitute a promi-
sing approach to stimulating economic growth in the EMU. However, since the question does not 
cover financing issues (e.g. on more flexibility for deficit finance), it is not clear whether this reflects 
a real political consensus on specific additional national or European investment programmes.
Support for collaboration in Europe in the fields of defence and immigration policy is also present 
in the general electorate, i.e. MPs positions are consistent with representative population polls. 
Eurobarometer results from November 2014 and 2015 indicate the positive views of the French 
and German populations in regard to greater European involvement in immigration and defence 
(Eurostat, 2014 and 2015).
To sum up the evidence from our survey of national assemblies in both France and Germany, de-
fence and immigration policies require particularly extensive attention and scrutiny in the post-
Brexit debate aimed at identifying possible steps towards further integration in the EU.
Potential for 
Further Integration in 
Immigration and 
Defence Policies
Limited Consensus 
on Euro Area Policies
High Priority of 
National Investments
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Appendix1 
A1 Competency allocation in Europe
Energy policy
The EU should be able to enforce binding guidelines on the Member States regarding the 
energy mix (e.g. the share of renewable energies, coal or nuclear power).
Disagree Undecided Agree
☐ -4 ☐ -3 ☐ -2 ☐ -1 ☐ 0 ☐ +1 ☐ +2 ☐ +3 ☐ +4
Immigration policy
The EU should be given a greater role in immigration policy (e.g. decisions on admission stan-
dards or allocation of refugees).
Disagree Undecided Agree
☐ -4 ☐ -3 ☐ -2 ☐ -1 ☐ 0 ☐ +1 ☐ +2 ☐ +3 ☐ +4
Tax policy
The Council of the European Union should be able to vote on taxes with a qualified majority 
(e.g. binding caps or floors for corporate taxes) 
Disagree Undecided Agree
☐ -4 ☐ -3 ☐ -2 ☐ -1 ☐ 0 ☐ +1 ☐ +2 ☐ +3 ☐ +4
Wage policy
The EU should have greater right to intervene in wage policies (e.g. regarding the level of ge-
neral statutory minimum wages).
Disagree Undecided Agree
☐ -4 ☐ -3 ☐ -2 ☐ -1 ☐ 0 ☐ +1 ☐ +2 ☐ +3 ☐ +4
Labour market regulation
The EU should be able to enforce binding guidelines on the Member States in regard to the 
labour market (e.g. the design of dismissal protection or temporary contracts).
Disagree Undecided Agree
☐ -4 ☐ -3 ☐ -2 ☐ -1 ☐ 0 ☐ +1 ☐ +2 ☐ +3 ☐ +4
Defence policy 
A European army under the command of the EU and financed from its budget should take over 
duties from national armies in international conflict deployments.
Disagree Undecided Agree
☐ -4 ☐ -3 ☐ -2 ☐ -1 ☐ 0 ☐ +1 ☐ +2 ☐ +3 ☐ +4
1  The questions have been translated by the authors into English from the original versions in French and German.
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A2 Reform initiatives in the EMU
A2.1 European reform initiatives and current policies
European unemployment insurance
A common European unemployment insurance should be introduced to absorb recessions in 
individual Member States of the EMU.
Disagree Undecided Agree
☐ -4 ☐ -3 ☐ -2 ☐ -1 ☐ 0 ☐ +1 ☐ +2 ☐ +3 ☐ +4
Eurobonds
All euro countries are jointly liable for Eurobonds and all euro countries pay the same inte-
rest. The EMU should issue Eurobonds.
Disagree Undecided Agree
☐ -4 ☐ -3 ☐ -2 ☐ -1 ☐ 0 ☐ +1 ☐ +2 ☐ +3 ☐ +4
Asset purchase program of ECB
The European central bank did play a very active role in recent years by purchasing sovereign 
bonds from euro countries. The active intervention of the ECB should continue.
Disagree Undecided Agree
☐ -4 ☐ -3 ☐ -2 ☐ -1 ☐ 0 ☐ +1 ☐ +2 ☐ +3 ☐ +4
A2.2 National policies
Higher investment
For higher economic growth of the EMU it is essential that its Member States increase their 
investment expenditures.
Disagree Undecided Agree
☐ -4 ☐ -3 ☐ -2 ☐ -1 ☐ 0 ☐ +1 ☐ +2 ☐ +3 ☐ +4
Flexible labour markets
For higher economic growth of the EMU it is essential that particularly countries with per-
manently high levels of unemployment make their labour markets more flexible (e.g. via an 
easing of dismissal protection regulations or a decrease of the statutory minimum wage). 
Disagree Undecided Agree
☐ -4 ☐ -3 ☐ -2 ☐ -1 ☐ 0 ☐ +1 ☐ +2 ☐ +3 ☐ +4
